Using data for emerging market firms that are either investable or uninvestable to foreigners, we study the effects of investability on fundamental volatility, excess volatility, and external finance. We find that fundamental volatility is lower for investable firms, while excess stock return volatility is greater. Share issuance is lower for investable firms, while debt issuance is essentially unchanged. These firm-level findings pose challenges to current theories of equity market liberalization, which contend that investability increases risk sharing, does not increase stock return volatility, and reduces financial constraints.
1
A good deal of evidence links equity market liberalization to economic growth. As examples, Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005, 2010) , Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2007) , and Quinn and Toyoda (2008) provide evidence that GDP growth increases following liberalization.
1 The literature also suggests that these growth effects are not accompanied by increases in volatility; Bekaert and Harvey (1997) , Kim and Singal (2000) , Christoffersen, Chung, and Errunza (2006) , Umutlu, Akdeniz, and Altay-Salih (2010), and Li et al. (2010) find that stock market volatility is either unchanged or lower following equity market liberalization.
2
In this paper we try to better understand how equity market liberalization affects economic growth and stock return volatility by evaluating four important firm-level barometers that have yet to be examined: fundamental volatility, excess volatility (the ratio of stock return volatility to fundamental volatility), share issuance, and debt issuance.
We measure liberalization with a firm-year dummy variable that indicates whether a firm is "investable, " meaning that its shares can be held by foreigners, or "uninvestable, " meaning that its shares cannot be held by foreigners. Many studies use country-level measures of liberalization, where the liberalization measure reflects either the percentage of firms in the country that are investable, or the date at which a country first opened its stock market to foreigners. Although such measures may be suitable for papers that focus on macroeconomic effects, a drawback of these measures is that not all firms become investable at the same time.
Our firm-level data tells us which firms are investable in which years, which allows us to conduct tests in at least two ways. First, we test for differences between investable and non-1 Some scholars are skeptical that equity market liberalization causes economic growth. Krugman (1993) , Rodrik (1998) , Edison et al. (2004), and Prasad et al. (2009) question the financial liberalization-economic growth relation. Rodrik and Subramanian (2009) review the literature, and conclude that financial globalization has been a "disappointment". A recent International Monetary Fund Position Note by Ostry et al. (2009) concludes that capital controls are beneficial. 2 In contrast, Bae, Chan, and Ng (2004) provide empirical evidence that equity market liberalizations increase stock return volatility. investable firms in the same country at the same time, while controlling for firm-level characteristics that could also affect our dependent variables. Second, because some firms switch status from uninvestable to investable during our sample period, we study firms over time, and test for within-firm differences before and after investability.
We first examine whether investability is associated with greater fundamental volatility, and whether considering fundamental volatility affects our inference about the impact of liberalization on stock return volatility. Obstfeld (1994) , Henry (2000 Henry ( , 2003 , Chari and Henry (2004 and 2008 ), and Martell and Stulz (2003 posit that equity market liberalization could promote economic growth by facilitating greater risk sharing. Greater risk sharing allows firms to invest in riskier projects, which should lead to higher fundamental volatility. We find evidence to the contrary--fundamental volatility is lower for investable firms. The causality of this result is undetermined. Firms may become investible at a mature stage of their life cycle, or investability may cause firms to pursue more conservative projects. Regardless of the causal link, this finding presents a challenge to the aforementioned literature that has linked investability to greater risk sharing.
Similar to previous studies, we find a negative association between investability and stock return volatility. We build on this literature by showing that taking fundamental volatility into account draws a different picture. Excess volatility, the ratio of stock return volatility to fundamental volatility is usually higher for investable firms. This suggests that foreign investors might make equity markets more volatile. This is consistent with Stiglitz (1999 Stiglitz ( , 2004 Stiglitz ( , 2010 , who argues that financial liberalization creates excessive volatility, because foreigners can quickly move large sums of capital in and out of emerging economies.
We then test for a direct linkage between investability and firm-level external finance. If equity market liberalization reduces financial constraints, then investability should be associated with more share issuance. Although the evidence discussed in Levine (2001) and presented in Gupta and Yuan (2009) is consistent with equity market liberalization reducing financial constraints, the only study to provide direct evidence of firm-level external finance is Chari and Henry (2008) . Chari and Henry (2008) use a country-level liberalization indicator, and show that for their sample of firms from 5 countries there is no conclusive change in external funding.
Chari and Henry (2008)'s country-level liberalization measure is noisier than the firm-year investability identifier used in this paper. Chari and Henry (2008) do not study share issuance and debt issuance separately, and equity market liberalization should have the greatest impact on the firm's ability to issue shares. We therefore build on their findings, by studying the effects of investability on share issuance and debt issuance separately.
Our external finance findings are surprising. We find that share issuance is significantly lower for investable firms.
3 With respect to debt issuance, the results are inconclusive. Across firms, investability is associated with more debt issuance. However, we find that when a firm switches from being uninvestable to investable, its debt issuance does not increase. It is therefore tenuous to argue that investability causes more debt issuance, especially because the link between equity investability and debt issuance is theoretically not straightforward. Taken in their entirety, our results do not support the notion that equity market liberalization promotes economic growth because firms raise more capital.
How does one place our findings in the context of the extant literature? We offer two broad explanations. First, consistent with critics of liberalization-it could be the case that 3 One might expect equity market liberalization to indirectly promote growth by creating better financing conditions for new firms, but Gupta and Yuan (2009) show that valued-added growth following liberalization is caused by existing firms, and not new entrants. We also study whether investability leads to more debt issuance. investability offers few benefits to emerging markets. This interpretation is broadly consistent with the arguments in Krugman (1993) , Rodrik (1998) , Edison et al. (2004) , Prasad et al. (2009 ), Rodrik and Subramanian (2009 ), and Ostry et al. (2009 . In this framework firms become investable when they mature, and this explains why investability is associated with less share issuance and lower fundamental volatility. The greater excess volatility reflects the volatility of foreign capital, a' la Stiglitz, (1999, 2004, 2010) , which is not making markets more efficient.
A second interpretation of our results is that although liberalization does not promote economic growth by risk sharing and external finance, it does lead to better corporate governance, which in turn leads to more efficient investment and greater growth. The findings in several papers support this interpretation. Henry (2003) points out that the increase in GDP growth that follows liberalization is simply too large to be explained by an increase in investment. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2010) contend that the reason that the growth effects following liberalization appear to be permanent is because liberalization improves economic efficiency. Mitton (2006) finds at the firm-level that investability is associated with greater operating performance. Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2007) and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2010) show at the country-level that equity-market liberalization is associated with more efficient investment and greater total factor productivity growth. Ferreira and Matos (2008) and Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (2010) provide firm-level evidence that foreign institutional ownership improves corporate governance and performance. Becoming investable could also cause more media attention and more analyst coverage, creating scrutiny which diminishes agency problems. These benefits have already been documented in a related setting in the cross-listing literature. For example, Doidge, Karolyi, Lins, Miller, and Stulz (2009) show that private benefit consumption declines when firms cross-list on a U.S. stock exchange.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, sample characteristics, and variable construction. Section 3 discusses the volatility findings; Section 4 discusses the share issuance and debt issuance findings; Section 5 concludes the paper.
Sample and Measurement

Data Sources
Our data comes from three sources: Standard and Poor's, Worldscope, and Datastream.
From Standard and Poor's we obtain the International Finance Corporation's investability indices (IFCI) for 24 different emerging markets. These indices report which firms' shares can be held by foreigners. These data are also used by Henry (2000) , Edison and Warnock (2003) , Chari and Henry (2004 and 2008) , Li et al. (2004 ), Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2007 ), Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2010 , Mitton (2006) , Mitton and O'Connor (forthcoming), and Li et al. (2010) . From Worldscope we obtain both quarterly and annual financial data, and from Datastream we obtain data on shares outstanding and stock returns. To be in our sample a firm-year observation must have its assets reported in Worldscope. If an observation has assets in Worldscope and is also in an IFCI index, we characterize it as investable; if an observation has assets from Worldscope and is not in an IFCI index, we refer to it as uninvestable. Our sample contains 89,814 firm-year observations during the period 1988- Panel A also shows that throughout our sample period there are 8,869 firm-year observations that belong to firms that switch from uninvestable to investable. The switch happens in a single year, so these observations include observations before, during, and after the year that a firm switches status. We use these observations to test for within-firms changes before and after the switch.
2008.
Describing the Sample in Terms of Investable vs. Uninvestable Observations
Panel B describes the sample in terms of firms, instead of firm years. Panel B shows that we have 10,764 firms in our sample, 2,263 of which are investable at some point during our sample period. Of these, 1,877 (17.4%) became investable during our sample period, meaning that during some years these firms are investable, and during other years they are not. Hence, our across-firm tests have more observations and are therefore more powerful than our within-firm tests.
Volatility and Financing Variables
In this Section we describe our volatility and issuance measures. These are the dependent variables that we use in our regressions. Summary statistics for these measures are reported in Table 2 .
Stock return volatility is the natural log of the standard deviation of the residual from a regression of a firm's monthly stock return on its previous month's stock return. This procedure produces an estimate of return standard deviation that is unbiased by first-order return autocorrelation, and illiquidity induces negative auto-correlation (for example, Roll, 1984) .
Changes in investability are likely to be associated with changes in liquidity, and thus this correction avoids faulty inference about changes in volatility that are purely a result of a change in liquidity. We use variables measured at the beginning of month t to forecast this volatility measure during moths t to t+12.
Fundamental volatility is measured separately for earnings per share, cash flow per share and sales per share. For earnings volatility, we measure the standard deviation of quarterly earnings shocks during months t to t+12. Like Irvine and Pontiff (2009), we assume that earnings follow a random walk, and measure an earnings shock as the difference between earnings per share in month t and month t-12. Measuring the shock over a 1-year period controls for seasonality. If a firm reports its earnings on a quarterly basis, then earnings volatility is the standard deviation of four earnings shocks. If a firm reports its earnings on a semi-annual basis, then earnings volatility is constructed using two earnings shocks. We measure cash flow per share and sales per share volatilities using the same methods. We take the natural log of each volatility measure, and use these variables as the dependent variables in our fundamental volatility regressions. 
Adjusted Shares t is then given by:
Adjusted Shares t = Shares Outstanding t / CAI t .
We use Adjusted Shares to compute a 1-year issuance and 2-year share issuance measures.
Share Issuance t+n, t = Ln(Adjusted Shares t+n ) -Ln(Adjusted Shares t ).
Debt Issuance is the change in the natural log of total debt. Total debt includes both short-term and long-term debt.
Debt Issuance t+n, t = Ln(Total Debt t+n ) -Ln(Total Debt t ).
Investment is the yearly change in property plant and equipment, plus the yearly change in inventory, all scaled by assets measured at the beginning of the year.
Control Variables
In this section we describe the control variables that we include in our regressions. These variables are also summarized in Table 2 .
Size. Smaller firms are more volatile and have more difficulty accessing capital markets.
Moreover, investability typically has minimum size requirements, so controlling for size is important in our tests. We use a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's assets in year t place it in the top tercile of all firms within the firm's country in year t.
Turnover. We measure turnover as shares traded over the past year scaled by shares outstanding at the end of the year. Investability usually has minimum turnover requirements.
Moreover, controlling for liquidity is likely to be important since stocks with lower turnover are less liquid, and low liquidity makes issuing equity more costly.
Zero Return Days.
This measure is the percentage of trading days in a month for which a firm had zero returns. Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999) develop this measure as a proxy for liquidity. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2007) show that zero return days predicts higher stock returns in emerging markets, consistent with liquidity being priced in these markets.
Foreign Sales. We use the percentage of a firm's revenue from foreign sales as a control variable. Firms with sales in other countries have more diversified revenues, and should therefore have lower fundamental volatility. Foreign sales may also proxy for foreign recognition of the company, which could influence liberalization.
Leverage. We measure leverage as total debt scaled by the book value of assets. We expect firms with higher leverage to have higher stock return and fundamental volatilities.
Cash Flow. All else equal, firms with lower cash flow need more external funds. We measure cash flow as net income plus depreciation and amortization, scaled by lagged assets.
Tobin's q (q). Tobin (1969) shows that firms with higher marginal q have greater growth opportunities and should invest more, and Mitton and O'Connor (forthcoming) show that investable firms tend to have higher q's. Marginal q is unobservable, so papers often use average Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) ). Firms that need to invest more should also issue more shares and debt, so we include q in our share and debt issuance regressions. Tobin's q is estimated as the market value of equity, minus the book value of equity, plus the book value of assets, all scaled by the book value of assets. Our measurement of q follows Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) and Rauh (2006) . We use the log of this q measure in our regression analyses.
Stock Returns. We also use lagged stock returns as a proxy for marginal q. This follows Barro (1990) and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) . Barro argues that the change in q is the appropriate proxy for marginal q. Barro notes that in practice most of the changes in q are the result of stock returns, and that changes in the accounting portion of q are sluggish and measured with error; he contends therefore that stock returns are the best proxies for marginal q. We measure stock returns as buy and hold returns over the previous six months.
Volatility Findings
This section of the paper describes our volatility findings. Fundamental volatility findings are discussed in Section 3.1 (Table 3) , stock return volatility findings are discussed in Section 3.2 (Table 4) , and excess volatility findings are discussed in Section 3.3 (Table 5) . Panel A shows a negative and robust relation between investability and fundamental volatility. In all twelve regressions, the investability coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, showing that investable firms have lower fundamental volatility than non-investable firms. To appreciate the economic significance, consider the regression in column 4, in which earnings volatility is the dependent variable. The investability coefficient is -0.280 (t-statistic = -3.18). The dependent variable is a logarithm, so this coefficient shows that earnings volatility is 28% lower for investable firms as compared to un-investable firms. These findings contradict the idea that investability promotes risk sharing.
Fundamental Volatility
The lagged volatility coefficients are positive and significant in each of the regressions in Panel A, showing that volatility is persistent. The leverage coefficient is also positive and significant in all of the regressions in which leverage is included, showing that firms with more leverage have higher fundamental volatility, as expected. The regressions provide some evidence that turnover and zero return days tends to be higher for firms with higher fundamental volatility, although these coefficients are not always statistically significant. Although we include turnover on the right hand side as a control variable, it is likely that changes in fundamentals cause high trading volumes.
In Panel B, the regressions include firm and year fixed effects. When firm fixed effects are included, only within firm variations in the variables affect the coefficients. As we explain previously, only 17.4% of the firms in our sample switch from investable to uninvestable during our sample period. Hence, the firm fixed effects regressions provide less powerful tests of the effects of investability as compared to the regressions reported in Panel A.
The results in Panel B are similar to those reported in Panel A. In all twelve of the regressions the investability coefficient is negative; eight of these are statistically significant. The findings in Panel B suggest that when a firm switches from non-investable to investable its fundamental volatility subsequently declines. Overall, the findings in Table 3 are inconsistent with the idea that equity market liberalization promotes economic growth by facilitating risk
sharing. Greater risk sharing should make investors less concerned about the particular volatility of any one firm. Hence, firms should be free to pursue riskier projects. These findings suggest that investable firms tend to pursue less risky projects, the opposite of what the risk sharing framework predicts. The findings in Table 3 also question the notion that investability causes lower stock return volatility. Although previous studies show that stock return volatility is lower for investable firms, this is to be expected if fundamental volatility is also lower.
These findings highlight the importance of firm-level control variables in assessing the association between investability and fundamental volatility. In panel A the coefficients on investability shrink by about 80% when control variables, and in particular q, are considered.
The firm fixed effect specifications in panel B produces a shrink on the investability coefficient of nearly 50%. These findings suggest that anticipated lower fundamentally volatility influences a firm's migration from uninvestable to investable. As we will show in the next section, this consideration carries over to stock return volatility.
Stock Return Volatility
In this section we estimate the relation between investability and stock return volatility. The findings in Table 4 are consistent with what most of the literature has found--stock return volatility is negatively related to investability. In all eight of the regressions, the investability coefficient (IFCI) is negative and statistically significant. In columns 1-4 (country and industry fixed effects), the results show that within the same country, investable firm-year observations have lower stock return volatility than non-investable firm-year observations. In columns 5-8 (firm fixed effects), the results show that when a firm switches from non-investable to investable, its stock return volatility subsequent declines.
The relation between investability and stock return volatility is economically significant as well. As an example, in column 8, the investability coefficient is -0.048 (t-statistic = 2.36).
The dependent variable is the natural log of stock return volatility, so this coefficient shows that stock return volatility is 4.8% lower after a firm switches from uninvestable to investable.
Since our set of control variables is fuller than previous volatility studies, we note how firm specific controls affect inference. Like the fundamental volatility results, the slopes on investability in the more complete specifications shrink relative to simple specifications. This comparison is starkest for the specifications that do not use firm fixed effects, where the slopes decay by about 60%.
Excess Volatility
Like most previous studies, Table 4 shows that stock return volatility is lower for investable firms. However Table 3 shows that fundamental volatility is also lower. Table 5 therefore studies the association between excess volatility and investability. As we explain previously, excess volatility is the natural log of the ratio of stock return volatility to fundamental volatility. As in Table 3 , we measure fundamental volatility three different ways; with sales per share, earnings per share, and cash flow per share. The format of Table 5 follows that of Panel B shows that if we limit our analysis to within-firm changes in a firm's status from uninvestable to investable we find some evidence of higher excess volatility for investable firms, although the effects are not as robust. Recall that only 17.4% of the firms in our sample switch status from uninvestable to investable, so these are less powerful tests than those reported in Panel A. In each of the univariate regressions investability is associated with significantly higher excess volatility, but once size and q are included as control variables the coefficient becomes insignificant.
Taken in their entirety, the results in Table 5 (2000)) stock return volatility. As we explain previously Shiller (1981) contends that the level of excess volatility, rather than stock return volatility, reflects the degree of noise trading. The findings in Table 5 therefore provide some evidence that foreign investors resemble noise traders, and no evidence that foreign investors resemble arbitrageurs.
Does Investability Reduce Financial Constraints?
As we mention in the Introduction, the empirical evidence regarding liberalization and economic growth discussed in Levine (2001) and presented in Gupta and Yuan (2009) is consistent with equity market liberalization reducing financial constraints. However, these papers do not include empirical tests that use share issuance as a dependent variable. If equity market liberalization reduces financial constraints, then we should observe investable firms issuing more shares than uninvestable firms. In this Section we directly estimate the relation between investability and share issuance.
As mentioned previously, our measure of share issuance is the real change in the number of shares outstanding, or the change in the number of shares outstanding adjusted for distribution events such as stock splits and stock dividends. We measure share issuance from year t to t+1
and regress it on the investability dummy measured at year t, along with control variables. As in the volatility regressions we include turnover, size and leverage as control variables. In addition,
we also include q, lagged stock returns, and cash flow, as these variables could also have effects on both share and debt issuance.
Investability and Share Issuance: Empirical Findings
We report findings for share issuance in and investability in Table 6 . In columns 1-4 the regressions include industry, country, and year fixed effects. In columns 5-8, the regressions include firm and year fixed effects. As in the volatility regressions, we cluster our standard errors on both country and year in all of the regressions. shares. We find a negative relation between investability and share issuance, suggesting that the growth effects documented in the literature cannot be explained by greater access to equity financing.
Investability and Debt Issuance
In this section we test whether investability is associated with debt issuance. The investability measure that we use reflects whether the firm's equity can be purchased by foreigners, and therefore has no direct link to debt issuance. However, it could be that lenders are more willing to lend to firms that have foreigner shareholders, so for completeness we test for a link between investability and debt issuance. Similar to share issuance we measure debt issuance as the change in the log of total debt, where the change is measured over a 1-year period. We use the same control variables that were used in the share issuance regressions in Table 6 . Table 7 is identical to Table 6 , except the dependent variable is net debt issuance instead of net share issuance. Like in Table 6 , the columns in 1-4 include industry, country, and year fixed effects. In columns 5-8, the regressions include firm and year fixed effects. We cluster our standard errors on both country and year in all of the regressions.
The findings in Table 7 show a positive, but not entirely robust relation between investability and debt issuance. In columns 1-4, the investability coefficient is positive and statistically significant in all four of the regressions. In columns 5-8, the investability coefficient is never significant. The findings in columns 1-4 suggest that across firms, investable firms issue more debt than uninvestable firms. The findings in columns 5-8 suggest that when a firm changes status from uninvestable to investable, it does not issue more debt. Hence, any difference in debt issuance between investable and uninvestable firm-year observations is attributed entirely to across-firm differences, rather than within-firm differences. As we mention previously, the across-firm tests are more powerful, because most firms do not switch status.
However the lack of any effect in the fixed effects regressions (even the univariate regression)
makes it tenuous to argue that investability increases access to debt financing.
Conclusions
This paper reassesses some of the costs and benefits associated with equity market liberalization. We conduct our analyses with a firm-year identifier, which tells us whether a firm's shares can be held by foreigners. This variable allows us to test for effects across investable and uninvestable firms, as well as for changes over time within firms that switch from uninvestable to investable. Our findings cast doubt on the notions that equity market liberalizations result in greater risk sharing, less volatility, and reduced financial constraints.
We find that fundamental volatility is significantly lower for investable firms. Hence, equity market liberalizations are associated with firms taking fewer risks, which is inconsistent with the notion that liberalization promotes greater risk sharing. Greater risk sharing should make shareholders more immune to firm-specific risks, thereby allowing firms to invest in riskier projects, resulting in higher fundamental volatility.
Like other studies, we find that stock return volatility is lower for investable firms.
However, as we explain previously, one cannot draw conclusions regarding the level of stock return volatility without considering fundamental volatility. We therefore measure excess volatility, which is the ratio of stock return volatility to fundamental volatility. We find that excess volatility is significantly higher for investable firms. This finding conflicts with the idea that foreign shareholders are sophisticated investors that make emerging market more efficient.
Equity market liberalizations are associated with a decline in share issuance; investable firms issue fewer shares than uninvestable firms. This finding contradicts the notion that equity market liberalizations reduce financial constraints. We find some evidence that investable firms issue more debt than uninvestable firms, although the significance of this effect disappears if firm fixed effects are included.
How can one reconcile the finding that firms that become investable have lower fundamental volatility, higher excess volatility, and lower share issuance? We offer two broad explanations. First, consistent with critics of liberalization-it could be the case that mature firms become investable, and mature firms tend to have less fundamental volatility and less of a need for share issuance. Foreign investment causes higher stock return volatility than fundamentals would dictate, albeit lower than the volatility of a less mature firm. In this framework the relation between liberalization and economic growth is not causal; countries choose to liberalize at the same time that they are poised for greater growth.
A second explanation, consistent with equity market liberalization causing economic growth, is that although investability does not promote risk sharing and does not reduce financial constraints, foreign stock ownership still promotes economic growth. The effect occurs through a reduction in information asymmetries and agency problems via greater scrutiny and activism from foreign investors.
Table 1. Sample Description
This table describes our sample in terms of whether the firms in each of the 24 emerging markets in our sample can be held by foreigners. Panel A reports on firm-year observations, while Panel B reports on firms. From Standard and Poor's we obtain the International Finance Corporation's (IFC) investability indices. These indices report which firms can be held by foreigners. To be in our sample a firm-year observation must have its assets reported in Worldscope. In Panel A, if an observation has assets in Worldscope and is also in the IFC index, we characterize it as "Investable"; if the observation assets from Worldscope and is not in the IFC index, we refer to it as "Uninvestable". Observations for firms that are investable in the current year but were not investable in the previous year are referred to as "Switched". In Panel B, if a firm is investable during at least one year during our sample period we refer to it as "Investable". If a firm is never investable then we refer to it as "Uninvestable". If a firm is both investable and uninvestable during our sample period we refer to it as "Switched". This table reports summary statistics for the variables used in this study. Stock return volatility is the natural log of the standard deviation of the residual from a regression of a firm's monthly stock return on its previous month's stock return during months t to t+12. Fundamental volatility is measured separately for earnings, cash flow and sales. For earnings volatility, we measure the standard deviation of quarterly earnings shocks during months t to t+12. We measure an earnings shock as the difference between earnings per share in month t and month t-12. We measure cash flow and sales volatilities using the same methods. We take the natural log of each volatility measure. Excess volatility is the log of the ratio of stock return volatility to fundamental volatility. We construct three such measures for earnings, cash flow and sales volatilities. Share issuance is the real change in shares outstanding, or the change in the number of shares outstanding adjusted for distribution events such as stock splits and stock dividends. Debt Issuance is the change in the natural log of total debt. Total debt includes both short-term and long-term debt. Size is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's assets place it in the top tercile of all firms within the firm's country. Leverage is total debt scaled by the book value of assets. Foreign Sales is the percentage of revenues from foreign sales as a control variable. Zero Return Days is the percentage of trading days in a month for which a firm had zero returns. Turnover is shares traded over the past year scaled by shares outstanding at the end of the year. Cash Flow is net income plus depreciation and amortization, scaled by lagged assets. Tobin's q (q) is estimated as the market value of equity, minus the book value of equity, plus the book value of assets, all scaled by the book value of assets. Stock Returns are buy and hold returns over the previous six months. 
Panel A: Firm-Year Observations
Regression Analyses of Fundamental Volatility and Investability
This table reports the results form pooled regressions. The dependent variable is fundamental volatility, which is measured separately for earnings (columns 1-4), cash flow (columns 5-8) and sales columns (9-12). For earnings volatility, we measure the standard deviation of quarterly earnings shocks during months t to t+24. We measure an earnings shock as the difference between earnings per share in month t and month t-12. We measure cash flow and sales volatilities using the same methods. We take the natural log of each volatility measure. These volatility measures are regressed on IFCI, which is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is in the IFCI investability index for that year and zero otherwise. If the dummy is equal to 1, then foreigners can buy the firm's shares. The control variables are as follows. Tobin's q (q) is estimated as the market value of equity, minus the book value of equity, plus the book value of assets, all scaled by the book value of assets. Size is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's assets place it in the top tercile of all firms within the firm's country. Turnover is shares traded over the past year scaled by shares outstanding at the end of the year. Zero Return Days is the percentage of trading days in a month for which a firm had zero returns. Foreign Sales is the percentage of revenues from foreign sales as a control variable. Leverage is total debt scaled by the book value of assets. All of the regressions include year fixed effects. Lagged volatility is the previous year's volatility, where volatility is the same type as the dependent variable (e.g. earnings). In Panel A the regressions include industry and country fixed effects, while in Panel B the regressions include firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered on country and year. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%.
Panel A Year, Industry and Country Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Table 4 .
Regression Analyses of Stock Return Volatility and Investability
This table reports the results from pooled regressions. The dependent variable is stock return volatility, which is the natural log of the standard deviation of the residual from a regression of a firm's monthly stock return on its previous month's stock return during months t to t+12 is regressed on IFCI, which is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is in the IFCI investability index for that year and zero otherwise. If the dummy is equal to 1,then foreigners can buy the firm's shares. The control variables are as follows. Tobin's q (q) is estimated as the market value of equity, minus the book value of equity, plus the book value of assets, all scaled by the book value of assets. Size is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's assets place it in the top tercile of all firms within the firm's country. Turnover is shares traded over the past year scaled by shares outstanding at the end of the year. Zero Return Days is the percentage of trading days in a month for which a firm had zero returns. Foreign Sales is the percentage of revenues from foreign sales as a control variable. Leverage is total debt scaled by the book value of assets. All of the regressions include year fixed effects. In columns 1-4 the regressions include industry and country fixed effects, while in regressions 5-8 the regressions include firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered on country and year. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%.
(1) Table 5 .
Regression Analyses of Excess Volatility and Investability
This table reports the results form pooled regressions. The dependent variable is excess volatility, which is the log of the ratio of stock return volatility to fundamental volatility. Excess volatility is measured separately for earnings (columns 1-4), cash flow (columns 5-8) and sales columns (9-12). These volatility measures are regressed on IFCI, which is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is in the IFCI investability index for that year and zero otherwise. If the dummy is equal to 1, then foreigners can buy the firm's shares. The control variables are as follows. Size is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's assets place it in the top tercile of all firms within the firm's country. Turnover is shares traded over the past year scaled by shares outstanding at the end of the year. Foreign Sales is the percentage of revenues from foreign sales as a control variable. Leverage is total debt scaled by the book value of assets. All of the regressions include year fixed effects. In Panel A the regressions include industry and country fixed effects, while in Panel B the regressions include firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered on country and year. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. Size is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's assets place it in the top tercile of all firms within the firm's country. Zero Return Days is the percentage of trading days in a month for which a firm had zero returns. Turnover is shares traded over the past year scaled by shares outstanding at the end of the year. Leverage is total debt scaled by the book value of assets. Cash Flow is net income plus depreciation and amortization, scaled by lagged assets. Lagged issue is Share issuance measured in the previous year. Stock Returns are buy and hold returns over the previous six months. Tobin's q (q) is estimated as the market value of equity, minus the book value of equity, plus the book value of assets, all scaled by the book value of assets. All of the regressions include year fixed effects. In Panel A the regressions include industry and country fixed effects, while in Panel B the regressions include firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered on country and year. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. Table 7 .
Regression Analyses of Debt Issuance and Investability
This table reports the results from pooled regressions. Debt issuance is the 1-year real change in total debt. Debt issuance is regressed on IFCI, which is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is in the IFCI investability index for that year and zero otherwise. If the dummy is equal to 1, then foreigners can buy the firm's shares. Size is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's assets place it in the top tercile of all firms within the firm's country. Zero Return Days is the percentage of trading days in a month for which a firm had zero returns. Turnover is shares traded over the past year scaled by shares outstanding at the end of the year. Leverage is total debt scaled by the book value of assets. Cash Flow is net income plus depreciation and amortization, scaled by lagged assets. Lagged issue is Debt issuance measured in the previous year. Stock Returns are buy and hold returns over the previous six months. Tobin's q (q) is estimated as the market value of equity, minus the book value of equity, plus the book value of assets, all scaled by the book value of assets. All of the regressions include year fixed effects. In Panel A the regressions include industry and country fixed effects, while in Panel B the regressions include firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered on country and year. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. 
